Sources Of Stability And Decline In Tokugawa Japan

SOURCES OF STABILITY AND DECLINE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN

The Tokugawa period (1600-1868) in Japan was marked by unprecedented peace following decades of nearly continuous warfare during the Sengoku period (1467-1573) (Gordon 11). The Tokugawa bakufu quickly moved to bolster social order by implementing harsh restrictions, including limits on provincial daimyo, unequal social class mobility, and interactions with foreigners, which would eventually serve as significant sources of its decline. The main internal cause of the breakdown of the Tokugawa regime, according to “The Meiji Revolution,” “was its unmoving order... amidst a shifting socioeconomic foundation.”

Peace in Tokugawa Japan was made possible in part by a forcible weakening of provincial warlords, or daimyo. Following the Battle of Sekigahara of 1600, Ieyasu Tokugawa and his successors instituted numerous restrictions on daimyo by forbidding formal alliances, managing family marriages, withholding political positions, and requiring pledges of loyalty (Gordon 14-15). The bakufu even confiscated and relocated whole domains, cushioning family domains (shinpan) from domains of previously unallied daimyo (tozama) with domains controlled by close allies (fudai). The policy of sankin-kotai, instituted between 1635 and 1682, placed an unprecedented financial burden on daimyo who were required to live in Edo biennially, producing “hostage” families in Edo, and minimized incentives for armed rebellion (Gordon 15).

These restrictions fed antagonisms towards the Tokugawa bakufu, specifically in the western Japanese provinces which would facilitate the Meiji Restoration of the mid-nineteenth century. The Chōshū Domain, for example, fell from its previous position of power and had over 75% of its former lands confiscated, becoming one of many hotbeds of opposition (Craig 15). During each New Year’s meeting, senior clan leaders would evaluate the plausibility of displacing the Tokugawa bakufu (Craig 16). This dream would be realized some two centuries later, when Chōshū and Satsuma joined forces and successfully challenged Tokugawa rule.

Limits on social mobility within Tokugawa Japan were established by the “four divisions of society” (shi-no-ko-sho) (Varley 168). The samurai class, without a legitimate outlet for militarism, inhabited a restless existence in Tokugawa society, enhanced by feelings of betrayal by a social hierarchy designed to provide it with a privileged position. Social mobility within the samurai class became further restricted by an emphasis of abiding by sumptuary laws and minute differences in rank (Gordon 41). At a time when reformers were appealing for appointing men of merit within the Tokugawa regime and merchants, in charge of handling daimyo finances, gained control over urban centers, many samurai remained vocationally restricted by birth (Gordon 42). The rise of a bourgeoisie culture which celebrated luxury amidst a moralistic backing which condemned it only emphasized such social contradictions into the nineteenth century.

The system of sankin-kotai, mentioned above, helped significantly increase the volume of domestic commerce in Japan, catalyzing the urbanization of several key cities: five to six percent of Japanese people lived in cities with populations over 100,000 by 1700 (Gordon 24). This initial boom, however, was followed by nearly 150 years of economic stagnation, epitomized by morbid living conditions (Gordon 28). Unlike merchants, samurai were dependent on annual feudal stipends vulnerable to price fluctuations; many samurai faced increasing costs of living and became dependent on loans from merchant houses. This was one of many developments which led some Japanese to declare a “violation of the natural hierarchy of the world,” suggesting moral failings for which Tokugawa leaders were responsible (Gordon 30).

The arrival of a Portuguese ship on Tanegashima Island in 1543 served as Japan’s first formal contact with Westerners (Varley 143). Apart from a limited initial exchange, Iematsu Tokugawa soon pursued a policy of seclusion in the 1630s known now as “chained country” (sakoku). Restrictions were placed on foreign imports, geographic mobility, and contact with Westerners as a means of legitimizing Tokugawa leaders as “protectors” of Japanese institutions (Varley 164). This development was aided by a growing segment of academic nationalism within Japan, exemplified by claims of Japanese superiority in Shinron (1825) by Aizawa Seishisai (Varley 232). This dangerous position proved disastrous as the Tokugawa bakufu proved unable to deal with the challenges associated with a renewed foreign presence in the nineteenth century. 

Western nations changed “a low-grade crisis into an acute, revolutionary situation” (Gordon 47). A gradual diffusion of political power had produced relatively weaker shoguns and sparked questions of who should rightfully wield sovereign power in the nineteenth century (Gordon 16). When Abe Masahiro requested help from the daimyo in dealing with Commodore Matthew Perry’s demands in 1853, many daimyo, brought into the political fold for the first time, sensed a newfound weakness in the Tokugawa regime. With Emperor Komei’s refusal to provide imperial ratification for the provisions of the Harris Treaty in 1857-1858, certain groups, including the “men of high purpose” (shishi), emphasized a disconnect between the wills of the emperor and bakufu (Gordon 52-53). The emperor, previously in a politically defunct position, now became a powerful symbol of opposition to Tokugawa rule, demonstrated by popular phrases including sonno joi, and served as a justification for a “restoration” of imperial rule.

The Tokugawa bakufu, in its many attempts to maintain social order in Japan, ended up planting the seeds of its own demise. While policies such as restricting the daimyo, enforcing societal divisions, and pursuing national seclusion initially helped legitimize the Tokugawa regime, its inability to sustain such policies provided an opportunity for opposing forces to overcome positions of subordination. According to Gordon on page 47, as “rulers of outer domains... supported initiatives [at critical moments],” Tokugawa rule slowly crumbled.